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Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives
on Corporate Governance
Ronald W Masulist & Randall S. Thomastt
Private equity has reaped large rewards in recent years We claim that one major
reason for this success is due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity
over those of the public corporation. We argue that the development and trade of substan-
tial derivative contracts have significantly weakened the governance of public corpora-
tions and have created a need for financially sophisticated directors and much closer
supervision of management. The private-equity model delivers these benefits and allows
corporations to be better governed, creating large wealth gains for investors
INTRODUCTION
Does private equity create value when it acquires a company in a
leveraged buyout (LBO)? If so, how? This question has fascinated scho-
lars ever since the first big wave of buyouts occurred in the mid-1980s,
but has yet to be resolved.' A second, even larger wave of LBO trans-
actions from 2003 to 2007, brought to a shuddering halt by the recent
subprime mortgage crisis, has raised the question again as the current
market for private-equity deals has collapsed. While many of the old
arguments about underlying rationales for private-equity deals have
survived this dramatic downturn, we offer an important new motiva-
tion for future deals: private-equity investors are better risk monitors
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1 The earliest and best-known paper is Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corpora-
tion, 67 Harv Bus Rev 61,67 (Sept/Oct 1989) (positing that private-equity-owned firms would do
a better job of managing free cash flow than public companies). For further discussion of this
literature, see Part II.
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with better incentives than public shareholders at firms with signifi-
cant derivative trading activity and derivative contract positions.
As the subprime mortgage and 2008 banking crises have vividly
illustrated, the growing use of, and trading in, derivative instruments by
corporations has eroded the effectiveness of several critical corporate
governance mechanisms-the board of directors, the financial account-
ing system, and oversight by regulatory authorities-because firms lack
effective means of monitoring derivative risk exposure on a real-time
basis. This change has increased the importance of attracting financially
sophisticated, highly motivated corporate directors who can deliver
intensive monitoring of corporate risk management strategies, who are
capable of independently and effectively controlling firm management
to regulate derivative exposure, and who set senior management finan-
cial incentives to ensure that these executives' incentives and personal
risk exposures are aligned with those of firm owners.
We argue that concentrated private-equity ownership is and will
continue to be a very effective way of attaining the above objectives. Pri-
vate-equity involvement strengthens board monitoring of derivative ex-
posures by reducing board size, improving information flows to the
board, increasing board control over managers, sharpening director fi-
nancial incentives to monitor derivative exposure carefully, and attracting
highly qualified, more financially sophisticated directors who are better
able to understand the associated risks. It also creates incentives for man-
agers to carefully evaluate risk-return tradeoffs. These strengths could be
particularly important for financial firms that have experienced tre-
mendous write-downs of their loan portfolios in recent months.3 In this
regard, the Federal Reserve has relaxed its stringent regulations on pri-
vate-equity investment in banks and bank holding companies to facilitate
the flow of capital into banks. The Comptroller of the Currency has also
permitted a private-equity fund manager to purchase a bank personally,
rather than through the use of his fund, and thereby avoid having his
2 Derivatives are generally defined to include options, futures and forward contracts, and
swaps, as well as financial products with derivative contracts embedded in them such as convert-
ible securities, insurance, and reinsurance.
3 Dan Wilchins, Private Equity Is Viewed As a "Shock Absorber," Intl Herald Trib 17 (July 1,
2008) (stating that banks are in "dire need of capital" and suggesting that private equity may be
able to provide it).
4 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement on Equity In-
vestments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies 9-10 (Sept 22, 2008), to be codified at 12 CFR
§ 225.144, online at http:/Iwww.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressbcregtbcreg2008922bl.pdf (vi-
sited Jan 11, 2009). In certain circumstances, the new rules permit investors to hold up to 15 percent of
the voting power and 33 percent of the total equity without being deemed a controlling share-
holder (and thereby being subject to regulation as a bank holding company). See id at 10. They
may also appoint one member of the board of directors Id at 6.
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fund classified as a bank holding company! These regulatory actions
should facilitate greater investment in the sector by private-equity firms.6
Large increases in debt also create strong managerial incentives to
improve firm efficiency because they: (1) make stock prices much more
sensitive to improvements in firm value; and (2) motivate managers to
use firm cash conservatively and to eliminate underutilized assets so as to
minimize the risk of bankruptcy, financial distress, and the accompanying
forced management turnover. Moreover, debtholders and institutional
investors can further improve firm risk monitoring since they are large
investors who frequently hold both debt and equity positions in private-
equity-controlled firms.7 This gives them good access to and strong incen-
tives to monitor proprietary firm information flows to accomplish this
goal. Thus, the shift toward greater private-equity ownership in the econ-
omy can be viewed as a value-creating response to increased derivative
activity and contract exposure levels, especially in less competitive indus-
tries where product market competition is a weaker alternative mechan-
ism for motivating managers to improve firm efficiency and profitability.
This Article is structured as follows. In Part I, we explain the insti-
tutional details of private-equity investing in, and monitoring of, portfo-
lio companies. Part II discusses prior theories explaining why private-
equity investing creates value. We then turn in Part III to the implica-
tions of the increased usage of derivative securities for corporate go-
vernance at public companies, arguing that it has created important new
challenges at these corporations, especially for financial institutions.
Part IV analyzes how private equity benefits investors through improved
monitoring of their portfolio companies' derivative risk management
practices. We conclude with a brief summary and a discussion of future
areas for private-equity investment.
5 Peter Lattman, Flowers Not His Firm, Buys a Bank, Wall St J C6 (Sept 24,2008).
6 See Peter Lattman and Damian Paletta, Fed Gives Funds More Leeway to Buy Banks,
Wall St J Al (Sept 23, 2008) (discussing how the increased flexibility given to private-equity
firms will enable them to "make investments in some bank holding companies where they had
been reluctant to do so over the last few months"); The Lex Column, Beyond Buyouts, Fin Times
12 (Apr 9,2008) (describing a private-equity firm's "multi-billion dollar investment to recapital-
ize Washington Mutual" as indicating "where private equity's cash piles will go next").
7 Michael Jensen explains that this common practice is referred to as "strip financing," which
Jensen defines as investors holding "roughly proportional 'strips' of all securities in the capital
structure" and thereby reducing any conflicts of interest among the classes of claimants at firms.
Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J Applied Corp Fin 13, 25
(Summer 1991).
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I. PRIVATE EQUITY'S GROWTH IN RECENT YEARS
A. Background
What is private equity? The categories of investments that fall
within the general rubric of private equity include venture capital; mids-
tage company finance; distressed firm investment; LBOs of firms, divi-
sions, or subsidiaries of public and private companies; and going-
private deals. In this Article, we are primarily concerned with private-
equity buyout funds that, as repeat players in the buyout markets, faci-
litate LBOs and other going-private transactions.
Private-equity funds' relationships with their investors have not
been studied extensively due to stringent data limitations. One impor-
tant exception is a study by Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, who
examined the structure of private-equity funds using a sample of 238
funds raised from 1992 to 2006.8 They documented that "virtually all"
private-equity funds are set up as private limited partnerships with a
ten-year term in which outside investors act as passive limited part-
ners and the private-equity firm is the controlling general partner.9
Limited partners have limited or no withdrawal rights prior to the expi-
ration of the ten-year term. They are also potentially subject to addi-
tional capital calls by the private-equity general partner.
Private-equity management firms periodically raise capital for new
funds, usually every three to five years.'0 This system has the advantage
of permitting investors in earlier funds to observe the private-equity
group's performance over time and to choose whether to invest in later
funds based on the private-equity firm's prior performance. Furthermore,
each fund has a limited life, so the general partners must raise new funds
to continue investing. In order to raise new funds, they are under great
pressure to demonstrate good performance for their existing funds."
The buyout firms earn fees from a variety of different sources: man-
agement fees, which are typically 2 percent of committed and/or invested
capital; carried interest, which is usually 20 percent of the profits earned
by the fund on its investments, subject to various adjustments, thresholds,
and hurdles; transaction fees, which are paid to the fund when it buys or
8 See Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds *2 (Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School, Department of Finance Working Paper, Sept 2007),
online at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-rlwctr/papers/0717.pdf (visited Jan 11,2009).
9 Id at *2.
10 Id at *3.
11 This is especially the case since existing investors have been identified as interested in
private-equity investments and are most likely to become limited partners in future funds, pro-
vided they did well in prior funds.
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sells a portfolio company; and monitoring fees for its work helping to
manage the portfolio company while it is owned by the buyout firm.2
Most private-equity firms use similar financing techniques in ac-
quiring portfolio companies. The typical LBO or other going-private
transaction is structured as a purchase of all of the publicly held stock
of a corporation by a privately held acquisition vehicle. 3 A private-
equity buyout firm generally controls this entity, with other types of
buyers being much less common." The private-equity firm sponsoring
the transaction will obtain its capital from the equity contributions of its
buyout fund and the managers of the target firm plus the cash proceeds
from privately placed loans secured by target firm assets and expected
cash flows. As part of the acquisition, managers of the target firm obtain
a significant equity interest in the firm. Normally, top managers in pri-
vate-equity-owned firms have equity interests that are ten to twenty
times larger than those held by their public company counterparts."
After the acquisition, the general partners in the private-equity
fund are actively involved in the strategic direction of the portfolio
company.16 They normally have operational control over the company
through their control of its board of directors. The general partners act
as advisors to the portfolio company's management and as members of
the company's board of directors, and draw on their expertise in corpo-
rate restructurings and their contacts throughout the industry to assist
in creating value. However, when needed, the private-equity partners
can use their control to swiftly alter company policies, remove under-
performing executives, or challenge management to perform better."
The boards of LBO portfolio companies are typically comprised of
the CEO, private-equity firm representatives, and outside industry ex-
perts, and they primarily act to advise management'on strategic consid-
12 Metrick and Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds at *6-13 (cited in note 8)
(developing an expected-revenue model for private-equity firms).
13 James F. Cotter and Sarah W. Peck, The Structure of Debt and Active Equity Investors:
The Case of the Buyout Specialist, 59 J Fin Econ 101, 102-03 (2001) (discussing the various com-
binations of debt-subordinated, senior, long-term, and short-term-and third-party equity that
leveraged buyout shops use to purchase the publicly held shares of target companies).
14 Id at 111-12 (finding that buyout specialists purchased a median 51.6 percent of the com-
mon stock of target companies in a sample of sixty-four LBOs, while target firm managers held
20 percent and third-party equity investors held the remaining 28.4 percent of the shares).
15 Steven N. Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and
Value, 24 J Fin Econ 217,246 (1989). See also Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am Econ Rev 323, 326 (1986) ("Top-level managers fre-
quently receive 15-20 percent of the equity.").
16 Michael C. Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity (and Some Concerns) *15 (Har-
vard NOM Research Paper No 07-02, Nov 2007), online at http:/ssm.com/abstract=963530 (visited
Jan 11,2009).
17 See Brian Cheffins and John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 Del J Corp L 1,
13-14 (2008).
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eration ' They are more effective than public company boards, as "even
the best part-time independent directors are not the equivalent of full-
time, highly incentivized private-equity managers."'" The CEO is a direc-
tor, although not usually the board's chair, while the other officers are
active ex officio members of the board.° In addition, these boards tend
21to be small and meet frequently, facilitating rapid decisionmaking.
Unlike public companies, boardroom activity in LBO firms is less
concerned with regulatory compliance, committee work, and process.-
There is better information available to top management and board
members because of initial extensive due diligence, specialized internal
reporting requirements, and the board's more intense operational fo-
cus. Moreover, there is a different social dynamic on the board, such
that anything can be discussed and all assumptions are subject to re-
consideration. 24
Given the finite life of LBO limited partnerships, general partners
manage their LBO firms with an eye toward ultimately liquidating their
investment. The primary exit choices are to take the firm public in an
IPO (reverse LBO), sell to a strategic buyer, sell to another private-
equity fund, or conduct a piecemeal liquidation. IPOs typically yield
the highest return for the private-equity fund's investors, while sales to
strategic buyers are generally considered the second-best option. 
2
18 Geoffrey Colvin and Ram Charan, Private Equity, Private Lives, Fortune 190 (Nov 27,
2006) (describing how private-equity-owned firms' boards are different from public company
boards and "far more involved in assisting the company"); Cotter and Peck, 59 J Fin Econ at 137
(cited in note 13) ("Thus, buyout specialists are likely to more effectively monitor managers by
having more seats on the board and by having smaller boards.").
19 Ronald J. Gilson and Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership,
Agency Costs; and Complete Capital Markets, 108 Colum L Rev 231, 259-60 (2008) (suggesting
that private ownership increases the value of a firm in part through "reduced agency costs"
resulting from a more active board of directors).
20 Jensen, Economic Case at *15 (cited in note 16).
21 See, for example, Viral V. Acharya and Conor Kehoe, Corporate Governance and Value Crea-
tiorn Evidence from Private Equity *34 (London Business School Working Paper, May 2008), online
at http://www.bvca.couk/pdtphp?id=901&filename=corporate-govemance-and-valuecreation:_
evidencefromprivate-equity (visited Jan 11, 2009); Francesca Cornelli and Oguzhan Karakas,
Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?, in Globaliza-
tion of Alternative Investments Working Papers Volume 1: The Global Economic Impact of Private
Equity Report 2008 65, 72 (World Economic Forum 2008), online at httpl./www.weforumorg/
pdf/cgi/pe/FullReport.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009); Robert Gertner and Steven N. Kaplan, The Value-
maximizing Board *13 (NBER Working Paper, Dec 1996), online at http://faculty.chicagobooth.
edu/steven.kaplan/research/gerkap.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
22 See Cheffins and Armour, 33 Del J Corp L at 14 (cited in note 17).
23 Jensen, Economic Case at *16 (cited in note 16).
24 See Michael C. Jensen, The Modem Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Inter-
nal Control Systems, 48 J Fin 831,863 (1993); Jensen, Economic Case at *16 (cited in note 16).
25 These buyers would value any improvements in operating performance at the portfolio
company created by the selling private-equity owners according to whether they believe that
such gains will be temporary or permanent. This gives the private-equity seller an incentive to
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B. The Development of Private-equity Capital
Private-equity financing started from rather modest roots. Prior to
1980, the total amount of capital in the private-equity market equaled
between $2.5 and $3.0 billion, with new capital inflows at less than $100
million per year."6 Only in the 1980s, after deregulatory initiatives at the
Department of Labor and the SEC removed important obstacles to
institutional investors putting large amounts of capital into the asset
class, did the first private-equity boom begin. The mid-to-late part of
the 1980s was an active period for LBOs, before market conditions
changed and LBO activity declined rather sharply in the early 1990s.
Over the past several years, there has been an explosion in private-
equity fundraising. Recent estimates are that in 2005-2006, the private-
equity/LBO market had reached 5 percent of the capitalization of the
US stock market, or about 1.4 percent of global GDP' The rapid
growth in this market arose from favorable credit market conditions, a
huge increase in the size of private-equity funds' resources, and the
increased importance of hedge funds.
After mid-2007, however, private-equity-financed deals dropped
off sharply. Increasing competition among bidders had driven deal pric-
es higher, while accommodating credit markets permitted the average
multiple of debt to cash flow to rise to historically high levels.9 High
prices and greater debt loads elevated default risks for the newly pri-
vate firms. Things fell apart when the credit market for private-equity
ensure that the changes will persist. In the case of a strategic buyer, this would mean that the
acquirer would have to be convinced that its management could replicate the private-equity
firm's success in improving risk management or any other sources of the improved operating
performance. In a reverse LBO, potential investors would need to see that the newly public firm
could duplicate its past success with a less concentrated ownership structure. In this regard, these
investors could take comfort from evidence that operating performance improvements at re-
verse LBO firms persist for at least several years after the firm returns to public ownership. See
Gertner and Kaplan, The Value-maximizing Board at *17, table 1 (cited in note 21).
26 Daniel A. Wingerd, The Private Equity Market: History and Prospects, Investment Policy
Mag 26, 30 (Sept/Oct 1997) (describing how the weak stock market and inadequate supply of
qualified entrepreneurs led to poor conditions for venture capital in the 1970s).
27 See id at 30-32 (arguing that regulatory changes in 1980 meant that "outside managers
of plan assets in the venture arena could now be paid proportionately to their success, a vital
element in the venture capitalists' mode of doing business"); Valentine V. Craig, Merchant Bank-
ing: Past and Present, 14 FDIC Banking Review 29, 30 (Sept 2001), online at http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analyticallbanking/2001sep/br200lvl4nlart2.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) (describing the history
of the private-equity market in the United States from the 1800s to the present).
28 Viral V. Acharya, Julian Franks, and Henri Servaes Private Equity: Boom or Bust?, 19 J
Applied Corp Fin 44, 44 (Fall 2007) (describing how new private-equity or LBO transactions
amounted to $500 billion globally, of which $200 billion was spent in the United States and $140
billion in Europe).
29 Steven Rattner, How the Levers Fell Off the Buyout Machine, Fm Tunes 13 (Mar 25,2008)
(noting how the value of leveraged buyouts announced between July 2007 and March 2008 equaled
"less than half the amount achieved in June 2007 alone").
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leveraged financing seized up around the same time as the subprime
mortgage market collapsed. Not only did this stop new financing from
being raised for new private-equity deals, but it also left huge invento-
ries of debt instruments on the books of major banks from older deals
that they had already completed, as well as a large pipeline of com-
mitments to finance existing deals.
A related problem was the decline in the quality of many of the se-
curities being used to finance these transactions. Financial institutions
originating the bank loans that were financing the vast upsurge in pri-
vate-equity deals were not retaining these loans on their own books,
but rather were syndicating them and selling them into the secondary
market. Because the originating banks were realizing large fees upfront
and then reselling these securities to third parties, the originating banks'
incentives to carefully assess the risks of each loan, to screen out weak
applicants, and to monitor their ongoing health were significantly wea-
kened." This created incentives for excessive risk taking in the LBO
market. Compounding this problem, many of these deals used "cove-
nant-lite" debt, where, because of highly competitive credit market
conditions, LBO lenders agreed to accept weaker contractual protec-
tions that reduced lenders' abilities to constrain or discourage oppor-
tunistic managerial conduct at these newly privatized firms.
While signs of a turnaround in the private-equity market recently
have been detected by some observers, the timing and prospects of this
recovery remain uncertain.' One question that hangs over the future of
the industry is: how strong are its claims that it increases value for in-
vestors? Equally importantly, assuming that private equity does create
value for investors, what are the sources of that value? In the next
Part, we address these questions.
II. DOES PRIVATE EQUITY CREATE VALUE?
Ever since private-equity deals first became popular in the 1980s,
academics have focused a substantial amount of attention on whether
they create value for shareholders. Furthermore, the sources of the val-
ue that may be created by private-equity transactions are crucial be-
cause some of them may involve wealth transfers or tax subsidies ra-
ther than social welfare improvements.
30 Acharya, Franks, and Servaes, 19 J Applied Corp Fin at 53 (cited in note 28).
31 See Serena Ng and Liz Rappaport, Is Debt Thaw on Borrowed Time? Buyout Bid-% Stock
Buybacks Junk Issues Offer Hope but Some See Short Window, Wall St J C1 (May 15, 2008)
(summarizing leveraged-lending executives' worries that a March to May 2008 improvement in
the credit markets was "a short-term window of opportunity for [private-equity] issuers").
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A. Improvements in Corporate Governance and Reduction of
Agency Costs
The most commonly cited argument for private equity creating
value is that these transactions lead to improved corporate governance
and therefore agency-cost reductions. However, the source of those
agency-cost reductions has been subject to some dispute, and five main
(overlapping) theories have been proposed, which focus on different
improvements in corporate governance. First, some authors have
claimed that LBOs reduce managers' discretion to misuse free cash
flow by ensuring that they must make debt service payments, by focus-
ing managers on more efficient operations, and by creating strong per-
sonal incentives to work hard to avoid bankruptcy. In this vein, Michael
Jensen argues that going-private transactions reduce the agency costs of
equity by cutting down on managers' discretion to misallocate cash into
empire building, empire preservation, and excessive perquisites.3 Em-
pire building and empire preservation in the face of poor performance
are directly contrary to the interests of company shareholders. Thus,
executives' single-minded concern for generating cash flow to pay down
a company's high debt from an LBO shifts the focus of management
from expanding the business in slow growth areas to growing a compa-
ny's equity value as rapidly as possible, even if it involves reducing sales
and shedding assets that have greater value outside the company.
Jensen argues that adding debt to a company's capital structure is
a more credible commitment by management to pay out future cash
flows, rather than investing them in negative present value projects.'3
In essence, by exchanging debt for equity, managers bond themselves
to pay out future cash flows and not to retain or reinvest them in un-
profitable ventures. Moreover, in Jensen's view, the increased risk of
financial distress motivates private-equity-owned firms' managers to
make their companies more efficient'3
A second source of potential agency-cost reductions in LBOs aris-
es out of a strong realignment of managerial incentives, which focuses
executives' efforts more sharply on performance and value.5 Private-
equity transactions give managers substantial equity ownership posi-
tions, resulting in strong financial incentives to work hard and ensure
their companies perform well. Steven Kaplan estimates that after a
32 Jensen, 67 Harv Bus Rev at 66-67 (cited in note 1) (noting how managers have "few
incentives to distribute the funds").
33 See id at 67.
34 See id.
35 Luc Renneboog and Tomas Simons, Public-to-private Transactions: LBOs MBOs MBIs
and IBOs *10 (ECGI Finance Working Paper No 94/2005, Aug 2005), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=796047 (visited Jan 11,2009).
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private-equity transaction, the top two corporate officers of the target
firm have increased their stock ownership to 4.41 percent on average,
while the remaining more junior officers have increased their owner-
ship positions to 9.96 percent.6 Top managers also frequently receive
large stock and cash bonuses when they perform well.
A third potential cause for reduced agency costs is the enhanced
management incentives caused by heightened sensitivity of stock prices
to firm performance. The rise in leverage, which occurs at the time of
the LBO, raises the elasticity of stock price revisions to firm value
changes.3 Thus, managers holding large equity positions realize much
greater wealth gains from improved firm profitability. This intensifies
manager incentives both to reduce costs and to increase revenues so
as to raise firm value.
A fourth source of agency-cost reductions in private-equity trans-
actions arises from improved board monitoring of management as a
result of much stronger financial incentives for directors and better
internal reporting. Basically, the LBO creates a shareholder with a
large block of shares, or blockholder, whose representatives are placed
on the board and given majority control,2 while management has
much more limited board representation.39 This increased concentration
of ownership and control rights eliminates the free rider problem of
monitoring management that is endemic to most public corporations.
Private-equity board members also have significant financial skills and
experience from their prior LBO investments, while public directors
generally do not; and they have better information to work with as well.
All of these factors together result in better monitoring.
A fifth benefit of private equity, emphasized by Steven Kaplan and
Per Strmberg,' is the replacement of ineffective senior managers with
highly talented executives. The ability of a privately held firm to quickly
36 See Kaplan, Effects of Management Buyouts, 24 J Fin Econ at 245 (cited in note 15)
(positing that the adjusted distribution of equity interest could "suggest that new incentives for
junior managers play an important role in buyouts").
37 This was demonstrated by Dan Galai and Ronald W Masulis, The Option Pricing Model
and the Risk Factor of Stock, 3 J Fin Econ 53,58-61 (1976) (concluding that "the systemic risk of
the firm [ ] and of its equity [] is not only a positive function of its leverage ... but that it is a posi-
tive function of the face value of debt [as well as several other factors]"); Robert Merton, On the
Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J Fim 449,466-67 (1974) (show-
ing that until some inflection point, the return equity investors demand from a firm increases
faster than the ratio of the firm's market debt to equity); Mark E. Rubinstein, A Mean-variance
Synthesis of Corporate Financial Theory, 28 J Fin 167, 176-77 (1973) (quantifying the effect of
financial leverage on the risk of a firm and its corresponding expected equity rate of return).
38 Cotter and Peck, 59 J Fin Econ at 111-12 (cited in note 13) (comparing the incentives of
the three types of controlling investors-management, buyout specialists, and outside investors).
39 Id.
40 Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strbmberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J Econ
Perspectives (forthcoming 2009).
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replace management, who can be entrenched in a publicly held firm,
and to locate and recruit highly talented executives to the firm by offer-
ing them much higher, performance-sensitive compensation is another
important element of the LBO process.4' This enables the going-private
firm to realize much greater levels of operational efficiency and sales
and profit growth.
However, there is one important critique of the claim that private
equity results in improved corporate governance and lower agency
costs. Bengt Holmstr6m and Kaplan 2 argue that private equity only acts
to restructure wayward public companies at one point in time. They
believe that this is generally no longer necessary because top executives
at public firms now get large amounts of stock options and incentive
pay to focus them on creating value for their investors. Furthermore,
public company management today is subjected to much closer moni-
toring by shareholders and directors so that they will pursue share-
holder-friendly policies. As a result, they claim that public corporations
are much more focused on maximizing shareholder value and the need
for private equity to fill that role has diminished or even disappeared.
Essentially, Kaplan and Holmstr6m argue that corporate governance
in US public companies has significantly improved over the last few
years, substantially lowering the agency-cost savings that private-equity
investors can attain from an LBO. The key issue then becomes: how
much further does public company corporate governance need to go?
Many commentators and researchers disagree with the Holmstr6m
and Kaplan position, arguing that senior management continues to do-
minate the corporate boards of most publicly held firms in the United
States and elsewhere.4 '3 These commentators claim that there is sub-
stantial evidence of this dominance, including excess CEO compensa-
tion, low sensitivity between CEO pay and performance, low sensitivi-
ty between CEO performance and turnover, low debt levels leading to
unnecessarily large tax payments, minimal restrictions on senior man-
agers' sales or hedging of firm equity, and general support by boards
for strong takeover defenses."
41 Acharya and Kehoe, Corporate Governance and Value Creation at *6 (cited in note 21)
(reporting that one-third of CEOs are replaced within the first 100 days of an LBO and two-
thirds are gone within four years).
42 See Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and MergerActivity
in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J Econ Persp 121, 136 (2001) (ar-
guing that LBOs disappeared in the 1990s because "they were no longer needed").
43 Lucian Bebchuk has been an outspoken advocate of this position. See generally, for
example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Executive Compensation (Harvard 2004).
44 See, for example, id at 1-10.
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Why might this managerial domination persist? One possible an-
swer is because the director nomination process at public companies
has historically ensured that directors care more about what CEOs
think than what shareholders think.'5 The current nomination process
is designed to give the existing board the right to nominate directors,
to give CEOs significant influence over which candidates are nomi-
nated by the board and to place restrictions on outside investors' ability
to make nominations. Going-private actions can result in improved cor-
porate governance and agency-cost savings by addressing this problem.
While improved corporate governance and reduced agency costs
are recognized by most researchers as benefits of going-private transac-
tions, many other motivations have been suggested. These include trans-
action cost savings from reduced SEC regulatory constraints, takeover
defenses, tax savings from high debt, expropriation of other corporate
claimants by stockholders, and undervaluation of targets. We review the
arguments and evidence on each of these alternative motivations below.
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Burden and Transaction Cost Reductions
The compliance costs of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ' (SOX), especial-
ly § 404's mandate that all firms engage in costly documentation of their
internal control systems,7 may be avoided if the company goes private. 4
However, a recent article by Robert Bartlett shows that many compa-
nies taken private are still subject to federal securities reporting re-
quirements and SOX's restrictions." Further, Christian Leuz reports acontemporaneous increase in private-equity transactions outside the
45 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis 146-48
(Little, Brown 1976). The increase in hedge fund shareholder activism over the past decade may
be pushing boards to a more balanced weighing of shareholder and manager interests. Hedge
funds' high success rates in their activist endeavors have heightened director sensitivity to their
interests. See Alon Brav, et al, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Perfor-
mance, 63 J Fin 1729, 1733 (2008) (arguing that because hedge funds occupy an "important mid-
dle ground" between internal monitoring by large shareholders and external monitoring by
buyout firms, they are in a "potentially unique position to reduce the agency costs associated
with the separation of ownership and control").
46 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, codified at 15 USC § 7201
et seq.
47 15 USC § 7262.
48 See, for example, Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L J 1521, 1588 (2005) (reporting that the cost of being public
more than doubled after SOX and that it imposed a "far more significant burden" on small firms
than on large companies).
49 Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sar-
banes-Oxley on Firms' Going-private Decisions, 76 U Chi L Rev 7,9 (2009) (discussing how most
going-private transactions require the target firm to issue high-yield debt securities, which "effec-
tively requires [the firm] to comply with SOX").
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United States that are not subject to SOX. 5 He argues that a general
boom in private-equity investment and the availability of debt for
LBOs is a more likely explanation for rising LBO activity.5' This evi-
dence suggests that SOX compliance costs are not that significant a
factor in going-private decisions for many firms.
Private-equity transactions are also claimed to reduce public com-
panies' other regulatory compliance costs substantially.52 One common-
ly cited type of cost reduction is the elimination of stock exchange list-
ing fees," which constitute future cost reductions over the period of time
the newly privatized firm remains unlisted.5 A related benefit is the eli-
mination of listing requirements that constrain firm capital structures,
ownership structure, and shareholder approval rights in mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) and other major firm decisions. Moving out of the
public eye may also permit firm managers to devote more of their time
to managing the firm and less to investor relations efforts designed to
educate public investors about managers' plans and actions at the firm.
Public disclosure requirements under securities laws can place
firms at a competitive disadvantage with other firms that are privately
held or are headquartered in countries with less demanding disclosure
regimes. So a third benefit of going private is to reduce public disclo-
sures of sensitive information by the firm.
At the same time that compliance costs have increased, the benefits
of being public may have declined for some companies Small cap public
corporations were adversely affected by the collapse of the technology
boom in 2001, which made the issuance of new equity more expensive for
these companies while simultaneously reducing the trading volume in
their stocks. The benefits of being public to many of these small firms
may have disappeared when they experienced falling stock prices, re-
duced liquidity, minimal analyst coverage, and lower trading volume."
In sum, there seem to be significant regulatory cost savings that
can be obtained by going private, and for at least some firms, particu-
50 See Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion
of Evidence from Event Studies and Going Private Decisions, 44 J Acct & Econ 146,161 (2007).
51 See id.
52 Luc Renneboog, Tomas Simons, and Mike Wright, Why Do Public Firms Go Private in
the UK?, 13 J Corp Fin 591, 597-98 (2007) (discussing how going private results in "the elimina-
tion of the direct and indirect costs associated with maintaining a stock exchange listing").
53 See Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, and Edward M. Rice, Going Private: Minority
Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J L & Econ 367,400 (1984).
54 Renneboog and Simons, Public-to-private at *13 (cited in note 35) (estimating savings of
$30,000 to $200,000 in service costs from going private).
55 Jana P. Fidrmuc, Peter Roosenboom, and Dick van Dijk, Do Private Equity Investors Take
Firms Private for Different Reasons? *1 (Working Paper, Feb 2007), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=968101 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
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larly smaller firms, these cost savings may exceed the benefits of being
a public company.
C. Takeover Defenses
Public companies that are threatened by the prospect of a hostile
takeover may want strong antitakeover defenses. A going-private trans-
action is the ultimate defense against a hostile takeover because the
private-equity firm and the target firm's managers buy out the public
shareholders in order to ensure that they obtain or maintain control of
the firm. This removes the possibility of an unwanted bidder obtaining
a controlling position in the firm through stock purchases without the
target company management's approval. This motive seems more likely
in management buyouts (MBOs) with large management representa-
tion on boards since in LBOs private-equity investors closely monitor
management. Another important limitation of this hypothesis is that
many companies that engage in LBOs are quickly taken public again,
and at least in some cases, their management loses control at that point.
A more recent variation on this theme might be that target firm
managers who are threatened by hedge fund activist shareholders may
seek to take their firms private to retain control over them. This moti-
vation is consistent with observed evidence suggesting that hedge fund
attempts at interventions frequently lead to private-equity buyouts at
targeted firms, especially at small- and mid-cap companies.57
While going private is one effective defense against takeovers,
there are also less costly alternatives such as recapitalizing stock into
dual class structures which include a class of publicly traded inferior
shares." Thus, one is left to wonder whether takeover protection can bea major force driving going-private transactions.
D. Tax Savings
Many scholars have observed that LBOs involve buying large
amounts of publicly held stock using borrowed funds. The resulting
highly leveraged capital structure creates high debt service obligations
for the newly privatized companies. However, one benefit of the in-
crease in interest payments is the enhanced corporate tax deductions
available to the firm. For firms with significant positive cash flows
from operations, tax benefits can play a major role in any wealth gains,
56 See Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 Colum L Rev 730,780 (1985).
57 Bray, et al, 63 J Fin at 1742 (cited in note 45).
58 If a hostile offer is pending or imminent, however, it may be difficult to win a sharehold-
er vote to approve a dual class recapitalization. Under these circumstances, an LBO or an MBO
seems more likely to be a successful defense.
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although these benefits may vary across countries depending on the
nation's particular tax system.59
Kaplan estimated that US private-equity deals generated tax bene-
fits equal to between 21.0 and 142.6 percent of the premium paid to
shareholders during the first half of the 1980s.'° Some scholars argue
that these benefits overwhelm the other potential gains from LBOs and
should therefore be restricted by governments." Luc Renneboog and
Tomas Simons question whether these benefits could be the real motive
for going-private transactions because prebuyout investors can antic-
ipate them and therefore should largely appropriate them in competi-
tive markets.6 If correct, this undermines the argument that taxes are a
major force for taking firms private.
E. Wealth Transfers to Shareholders from Other Stakeholders
Another theory about how private-equity transactions create value
for shareholders is that they expropriate value from nonequity stake-
holders, especially pre-LBO bondholders, either through increases in
the level of risk associated with new projects undertaken by the firm,
via large increases in dividend payments by the firm, or most likely
from a firm taking on more debt and/or more senior debt to that which
it had prior to the transaction. The value of existing bondholders' claims
on the firm will be reduced if the firm engages in any one of these activ-
ities unless those bondholders have contractual protections against the
firm's actions. One well-known example of an adverse impact on unpro-
tected bonds is the $25 billion RJR Nabisco Corporation going-private
transaction, where pre-LBO bondholders claimed they lost billions of
dollars when the company issued a large amount of additional debt to
finance the deal. Subsequent litigation filed by disgruntled bondholders
59 See Renneboog and Simons, Public-to-private at *16-17 (cited in note 35) (summarizing
academic literature that found a positive correlation between potential tax savings and the like-
lihood of going private).
60 See Steven N. Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes As a Source of Value, 44
J Fin 611, 623-24 (1989) (estimating the potential value of the tax benefits involved in an MBO
for companies facing a 15 percent and a 46 percent marginal tax rate, respectively). Kaplan esti-
mates that a company receives even higher benefits if it elects to make a step-up in basis. See id.
61 George M. Frankfurter and Erdal Gunay, Management Buy-outs: The Sources and Shar-
ing of Wealth between Insiders and Outside Shareholders, 32 Q Rev Econ & Fin 82, 93 (1992);
Lowenstein, 85 Colum L Rev at 731 (cited in note 56) ("Transactions of such suspiciously little
economic and social value require reappraisal.").
62 See Renneboog and Simons, Public-to-private at *17 (cited in note 35) (arguing that
going-private decisions by US firms in the 1980s were frequently motivated by "anti-takeover
defense strategies" rather than the opportunity to appropriate tax benefits).
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resulted in adverse court decisions for the plaintiffs that only empha-
sized how powerless bondholders are in this situation.6
LBOs may also yield some offsetting benefits to debtholders. For
instance, Laurentius Marais, Katherine Schipper, and Abbie Smith
claim that debtholders may benefit from a decline in the value of other
stakeholder claims if those declines result in increased firm assets.61 Fur-
thermore, Renneboog and Simons point out that the agency-cost reduc-
tions from increased debt and improved monitoring may raise the val-
ue of the firm and thereby benefit bondholders."
Overall, the empirical evidence about the effect of going-private
transactions on bondholders tends to show systematic decreases in preex-
isting bonds' ratings, but this does not translate into reduced bond pric-
es." On the one hand, when bonds have weak protection against corpo-
rate restructurings, they do lose value after an LBO.6' On the other hand,
bonds with strong covenants actually gain in value because firms seek to
renegotiate their terms in order to eliminate contractual restrictions on
maximum debt levels, or because firms are forced to repurchase these
bond issues at par, even when the issues are trading far below it. Thus,
nonconvertible bonds on average suffer minimal losses in value.
A second, less well-documented reason why shareholders can ben-
efit from LBOs is wealth transfers from other corporate stakeholders.
Such transfers can occur if firms breach their "implicit" contracts with
employees by firing them, or renegotiating their contracts, as part of a
post-LBO restructuring. Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers argue
that employees have an implicit, unwritten agreement with their firms
who promise to provide them with long-term (lifetime) employment in
63 See Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v RJR Nabisco, 716 F Supp 1504, 1526
(SDNY 1989).
64 See Laurentius Marais, Katherine Schipper, and Abbie Smith, Wealth Effects of Going
Private for Senior Securities, 23 J Fin Econ 155, 159 (1989) (indicating that a buyout may allow
management to reduce other stakeholders' claims on a firm's cash flows by, for example, cutting
back staff).
65 See Renneboog and Simons, Public-to-private at *10 (cited in note 35).
66 Marais, Schipper, and Smith, 23 J Fin Econ at 157 (cited in note 64) (finding "pervasive down-
gradings ... of Moody's debt ratings following successful buyout proposals" but indicating that there
was insufficient evidence to generalize about the effects of a buyout on bond prices); Yakov Amihud,
Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences 5 (Dow Jones-Irwin 1989). See also Mark
I. Weinstein, Bond Systematic Risk and the Option Pricing Model, 38 J Fmn 1415,1424-26 (1983).
67 See Arthur Warga and Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts, 6 Rev Fin
Stud 959,979 (1993) (concluding that in successful LBOs from 1985-1989, the typical bondholder
lost 6 percent of the risk-adjusted value of his bonds within four months of the LBO announce-
ment); Paul Asquith and Thierry A. Wizman, Event Risk, Covenant and Bondholder Returns in
Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J Fin Econ 195, 212 (1990) (reporting that "[b]onds that contain cove-
nants ... experience abnormal gains" while those "that do not ... suffer abnormal losses").
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exchange for lower wages.' These agreements are breached if the com-
pany fires many of its workers after going private. However, workers
are unable to recoup these losses from the firm because these implicit
agreements with their firms are legally unenforceable.
There are several reasons to think that these benefits are not large.
First, such a breach would only generate a one-time gain, because after
it occurs the first time, workers will factor into their future employment
decisions the nonenforceability of these implicit contracts, which can
raise turnover, increase hiring costs, and lower worker quality. Second,
on average, LBOs do not result in job losses.69 Furthermore, firing em-
ployees reduces a firm's production capacity and at some point lowers
the quality and quantity of output as too few employees are involved in
the production process.
A related potential wealth-transfer opportunity involves pension-
ers and employees. When a firm executes an LBO, it often eliminates
overfunded pensions and increases the default risk associated with its
pension liabilities. However, Jeffrey Pontiff, Andrei Schleifer, and Mi-
chael Weisbach find that these wealth transfers are modest.70 Thus, they
are unlikely to represent a major motive for firms going private.
F. Undervaluation of the Targeted Firms
Given their superior access to information and greater involvement
in the company's business, firm managers will generally have better in-
formation than public shareholders about the firm's prospects. This
asymmetric information distribution can provide managers with superior
understanding about the future value of the firm, allowing them to time
their purchase of the company in a going-private transaction to take ad-
vantage of a temporarily depressed price for the company's stock. More
perniciously, unfaithful managers may engage in techniques designed to
depress artificially the stock price in order to facilitate an MBO deal.
There is also the possibility that firms follow selective disclosure pol-
icies in their financial reporting prior to going private. Specifically, senior
managers have incentives to release bad information and to delay the
release of good information until after the transaction is completed. Of
68 See Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
Alan I. Auerbach, ed, Corporate Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequence 33,53 (Chicago 1988).
69 The evidence shows that post-LBO firms report small increases in employment levels,
but fail to expand employment levels as fast as the rest of their industry. See Steve Thompson
and Mike Wright, Corporate Governance: The Role of Restructuring Transactions, 105 Econ J 690,
697 (1995); Kaplan and Strbmberg, J Econ Persp at 17-18 (cited in note 40).
70 See Jeffrey Pontiff, Andrei Shleifer, and Michael S. Weisbach, Reversions of Excess
Pension Assets after Takeovers, 21 RAND J Econ 600, 601 (1990) (estimating that pension fund
reversions account for approximately 11 percent of takeover wealth gains).
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course, if this selective disclosure is detected, the firm and its senior
managers could be sued by shareholders as well as the SEC,7' and courts
are much more open to shareholder suits in going-private transactions.n
G. Availability of Derivatives Reduces the Risk-sharing Benefits of
Going Public
One impact of the vast growth in the use of derivative securities has
been to reduce the risk-sharing benefits of being a public company. Ro-
bert Merton was the first to argue that the existence of derivative con-
tracts raises the relative advantage of being private over being public by
permitting private firms to spread risks more widely." He notes that one
of the most important benefits of being public is risk-sharing. Since "pri-
vate owners internalize parts of the firm's risks which are diversifiable
with widespread ownership,""4 they gain by shifting this risk more broadly.
Another key benefit of being public is access to public capital markets to
support firm investment and expansion. As a private firm, expansion is
limited by the firm's inability to fund all its projects with added debt,
since the default rate on the debt is a positive function of a firm's assets'
total risk (or return variability) and its leverage (or debt-to-asset ratio).
Since the demand for equity of privately held firms has generally been
quite limited, with large price discounts demanded, equity capital raising
by private firms has generally been a very expensive option.
Merton then poses the following hypothetical scenario: "Consider
such a firm with needs for funding and risk sharing that believes it must
move to the public-ownership domain with all its costs (that reflect what
the finm gives up by going public)."7 5 However, if a firm can hedge these
risks, "then it could reduce the total variation or riskiness of the business,
without negatively impacting its profitability."6 This will reduce the
gains from risk-sharing and likely lower the future need to raise equity
capital. Merton concludes that "[t]o the extent hedging becomes wide-
71 17 CFR 240.10b5-1.
72 In re Topps Co Shareholders Litigation, 924 A2d 951,963 (Del Ch 2007) ("Few contexts
are more important to stockholders than the pendency of a transaction in which they exchange
their shares for cash and the company is taken private.").
73 See Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and the Management and Regulation of Finan-
cial Institutions, 19 J Banking & Fm 461,462 (1995) (claiming that the "rise of derivative products
could have just as easily been framed as greatly reducing risks in the system"). See also Gilson
and Whitehead, 108 Colum L Rev at 235 (cited in note 19) (suggesting that "risk management
[focused] at the firm level may be more efficient than broadband risk-bearing by diversified
shareholders"); Myron S. Scholes, Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment, 88 Am Econ Rev 350,
364,366-67 (1998) (characterizing equity as a "risk-management device").
74 Merton, 19 J Banking & Fin at 465 (cited in note 73).
75 Id at 466.
76 Id.
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spread, one may well observe a macro shift back toward greater private
ownership of firms as these hedging tools are developed" and refined.n
Given the tremendous growth in derivative markets since 1995, the rela-
tive benefits of public ownership as a means of risk-sharing and lowering
the cost of capital appear to have substantially declined.
H. The Costs and Possible Adverse Incentives of LBOs
LBOs also have some costs. Not every firm should be taken private;
a cost-benefit calculation must be made before such a course of action
is pursued. In this regard, it is important to include at least the follow-
ing expected costs of an LBO: higher expected bankruptcy costs, agency
costs due to intensified conflicts of interest among firm stakeholders,
the lack of stock liquidity, owners' reduced diversification of risk, the
disappearance of timely stock price information, the lack of periodic
financial disclosure, and a reduced ability to tap public capital markets.
Most of these costs also apply to any private company.
Note that not all the benefits of being public are necessarily realized,
especially for small public companies. For example, small firms may lack
analyst coverage and general investor interest. As a result, they may have
relatively illiquid stocks and find that making public offerings of securi-
ties is difficult and costly. This is a partial explanation as to why many
small companies faced with the higher fixed costs of meeting their SOX
legal requirements have chosen to go private and why many small firms
going private had only recently gone public.78 Thus, we need to carefully
assess the expected costs of being private against their expected benefits
to know if going public, or remaining public, is optimal for a firm.
While many suggested reasons for valuation gains in LBOs exist,
there is not a lot of evidence indicating that many of these suggested
benefits are empirically important. Furthermore, most of these benefits
represent private gains at the expense of other investors, corporate
stakeholders, or the government. The primary exceptions are various
agency-cost savings, which we argue are very valuable. Consistent with
the importance of these agency-cost benefits, there is strong empirical
77 Id. See also Scholes, 88 Am Econ Rev at 366 (cited in note 73) ("Ways will be found
through financial engineering to provide private entities with the advantages of the public mar-
ket-risk sharing, liquidity, and pricing signals-while retaining the advantages of the private
market-lower disclosure and agency costs.").
78 Many studies find that SOX has led many small US firms to go private. See, for example,
Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes, and Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-private
Decisions, 44 J Acct & Econ 116, 118 (2007). Another study documents that many LBO firms
were small and had IPOs in the prior five years. See Hamid Mehran and Stavros Peristiani,
Financial Visibility and the Decision to Go Private *3-4 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Working Paper, July 2007), online at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/peristiani/
mehran-peristiani.pdf (visited Jan 11,2009).
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evidence that LBOs lead to substantial improvement in firm operating
efficiency, enhanced management and board incentives, much sharper
focus on core operation, and substantial improvements in profitability
and valuation."
I. Agency Costs Associated with LBOs
While LBO transactions reduce many agency costs, they can also
create some agency costs. One serious agency problem with private-
equity investments is that after an adverse economic event, managers of
highly leveraged firms can have strong incentives to "bet the farm" to
avoid potential bankruptcy. A similar problem was highlighted in the
savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, in which adverse interest rate
movements triggered high-risk investment activities by thrift manag-
ers who attempted to forestall likely bankruptcy.
This managerial incentive problem is highlighted by Dan Galai
and Ronald Masulis, who analyze firm decisionmaking from the pers-
pective that stock in a leveraged firm is equivalent to a European call
option.'o Thus, if a leveraged firm experiences an adverse economic
event that pushes it into financial distress, then regardless of whether
it is closely or diffusely held, managers have incentives to substantially
raise firm risk to increase the firm's equity's (call option) market value
by raising volatility (a call option is a positive function of volatility
since it raises the probability of a large gain in value), even though the
debt's value suffers from a greater probability of default. This can lead
to a loss in firm value when risk-increasing actions involve negative
net present value projects.
79 See, for example, David J. Denis and Diane K. Denis, Leveraged Recaps and the Curbing
of Corporate Overinvestment, in Donald H. Chew and Stuart L. Gillan, eds, Corporate Gover-
nance at the Crossroads 318,320 (McGraw-Hill 2005) (surveying twenty-nine leveraged recapita-
lizations completed between 1984 and 1988, and concluding that these companies outperformed
the market by 26 percent, on average); Anju Seth and John Easterwood, Strategic Redirection in
Large Management Buyouts: The Evidence from Post-buyout Restructuring Activity, 14 Strategic
Mgmt J 251,258 (1993) (describing how conglomerates and other firms with unrelated divisions
divested assets post-buyout in order to focus on their core businesses); Kaplan, 24 J Fin Econ at
251 (cited in note 15) (stating that empirical evidence "supports the hypothesis that management
buyouts experience post-buyout operating improvements and value increases [that] appear to be
generated by improved incentives").
80 See Galai and Masulis, 3 J F'm Econ at 57 (cited in note 37) (analogizing an optionholder
who has "claim to the slice of a stock's price distribution to the right of the exercise price at
maturity date" to a firm's stockholder who has a "claim to the slice of the firm's price distribu-
tion to the right of the face value of the firm's debt at its maturity date"). See also Fischer Black
and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J Pol Econ 637, 637
(1973) (defining a "European option" as a "security giving the right to buy or sell an asset, sub-
ject to certain conditions,.., on a specified future date").
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This raises an important question: are there reasons why LBO firm
managers who hold concentrated equity stakes are less likely to expe-
rience these moral hazard incentives relative to managers at diffusely
held firms? We argue that several unique characteristics of LBO inves-
tors mitigate this problem for private-equity firmas First, private-equity
investors have strong reputational constraints on their behavior be-
cause they are involved in a number of separate LBO deals at any point
in time. Any actions they take that adversely affect debtholders in one
of their firms are likely to harm the ability of their other portfolio com-
panies to attract additional debt capital. Moreover, their ability to at-
tract future LBO deals is likely to be adversely affected because their
future access to debt will be constrained and potential firms consider-
ing going private will be wary of working with them as a consequence.
A second reason that LBO firms may be less likely to engage in this
behavior is that their private debt tends to have stronger and more ex-
tensive protective covenants, since renegotiating a private debt issue is
generally much easier when it is held by several financially sophisti-
cated investors who can also hold firm equity or derivatives. A third
important reason why private-equity firms will not "bet the farm" is
that many LBO investors finance these acquisitions in part with their
own captive debt fund. This means that they hold both the equity and
the debt securities of their portfolio companies, which better aligns their
interests with those of the other debtholders of their portfolio compa-
nies and gives them greater incentives not to undermine the value of
these debt investments. ' Finally, we note that private-equity firms have
strong incentives to pay down the debt load on portfolio companies
quickly in order to raise the value of their equity stake, so that this po-
tential problem should arise only for a relatively short period of time.
Another agency problem highlighted in prior research occurs when
private-equity firms take large fees on the front end but then hold
smaller equity ownership positions. In these cases, it is argued that
private-equity partners have weaker incentives to continue to closely
monitor management once the LBO is completed. They also have
greater incentives to take less promising candidates private because
their primary compensation is transaction fee-driven and thus paid at
the consummation of the transaction, regardless of how profitable the
81 As we noted in Part II.H, an LBO may create increased conflicts of interest among the
firm's debt and equity holders. When private-equity firms purchase both debt and equity inter-
ests in their portfolio firm, especially if they do so in a strip financing investment, see note 7, this
will better align the private-equity firm's interests with those of both debt and equity investors in
the post-buyout company.
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deal turns out to be."' Again, reputational concerns can generate strong
incentives for private-equity managers not to exploit their private-
equity investors in this way."
A third potential agency cost arises out of the recent trend of
multiple LBO shops sponsoring an LBO deal, so-called "club deals,"
which create additional conflicts of interest between LBO sponsors.8,
These conflicts could result in more agency costs in terms of free riding
by some sponsoring private-equity firms and disagreements among oth-
ers over a target company's major policies or proposed policy changes,
especially when a firm is performing poorly. However, this potential
cost can be minimized by limiting the size of club deals to two or three
investors, which is the norm." Another possible disadvantage of these
syndicated LBO deals is that the future portfolio company's stock ap-
pears to experience more insider trading activity prior to the announce-
ment of the transaction.8
82 See Acharya, Franks, and Servaes, 19 J Applied Corp Fin at 52 (cited in note 28); Gregor
Andrade and Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from
Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 J Fin 1443, 1483 (1998); Steven N. Kap-
lan and Jeremy C. Stein, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s,
108 Q J Econ 313,313-14 (1993) (finding that fees taken by buyout shops, investment banks, and
lenders trended upwards during the boom in buyouts during the late 1980s, growing from be-
tween 2.05 percent and 2.66 percent before 1985 to between 3.69 percent and 5.97 percent in 1988).
83 Evidence that this concern is not economically important has been found by Gregor An-
drade and Steven Kaplan. They studied a sample of highly leveraged transactions that subsequently
became financially distressed and estimated the effects of distress on firm value. They report that
"[flrom pretransaction to distress resolution, the sample firms experience a small increase in value.
In other words, the net effect of the [highly leveraged transaction] and distress is to leave value
slightly higher." Andrade and Kaplan, 53 J Fin at 1487 (cited in note 82) (arguing that this evidence
"strongly suggests" that highly leveraged transactions earned positive risk-adjusted returns).
84 Recent research suggests that these club deals may result in private-equity firms paying
lower prices when acquiring firms unless the targeted firm has high institutional stock ownership.
See generally Micah S. Officer, Oguzhan Ozbas, and Berk A. Sensoy, Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts
*2 (USC Marshall School of Business Working Paper MKT 10-08, July 2008), online at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1128404 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (finding that target shareholders received on average
10 percent less in club deals and suggesting that these findings are "consistent with the view that
club deals may be detrimental to passive, dispersed shareholders of publicly-traded corporations").
85 See Audra L. Boone and J. Harold Mulherin, Do Private Equity Consortiums Impede
Takeover Competition? *7 (AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper, May 2008), online at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1104224 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (reporting that the median number of bidders
in consortium deals is 2.84). Boone and Mulherin estimate that target returns for "private equity
consortium bidders" from sixty-three days before the takeover until completion were "not mea-
surably different" than for private-equity firms bidding alone. Id at *19-20.
86 See Viral V. Acharya and Timothy C. Johnson, More Insiders; More Insider Trading:
Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts *1 (London Business School Working Paper, Nov 2007),
online at http:/facultyresearch.london.edu/docs/Acharya-Johnson-Insider-Trading-Takeovers.pdf
(visited Jan 11,2009).
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF DERIVATIVES
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Weaknesses of Current Financial and Managerial Accounting
Systems in the Face of Active Derivatives Trading
Board monitoring at public corporations has been seriously un-
dermined by the growing use of derivatives. V These securities allow
firms to acquire large financial risks (such as those that financial inter-
mediaries are currently experiencing in the aftermath of the subprime
mortgage crisis) on short notice. This situation differs greatly from the
prederivative environment where a major change in firm risk exposure
generally required either a highly visible M&A transaction or a large
new investment initiative, both of which take a relatively long time to
implement, are easy to observe, and need explicit board approval.
Financial engineering techniques allow a firm to change rapidly its
risk exposure through the use of derivatives, which makes its risk pro-
file much less transparent and much more dynamic. In fact, it is very
easy to change these derivative positions on almost a moment's notice.
Further, most firms appear to have inadequate internal accounting and
control systems to track these derivative transactions on a timely basis
or to police effectively any existing position limits. The many deriva-
tives-related financial scandals are a testament to this weakness. The
problem has been compounded by the failure of many derivative trad-
ers to require highly detailed information on the assets underlying
their financial contracts.
Derivative contracts enable firms to create equivalent investment
positions by using a variety of alternative combinations of derivative
instruments that can be executed within minutes in most cases." Fur-
thermore, each of these alternative (equivalent) investments is often
regulated differently by separate regulatory authorities, including the
SEC, the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, the Federal
Reserve, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, and state insurance commissioners. In addition, financial ac-
counting systems do not treat all these equivalent financial positions
87 To see a measure of the rapid growth of derivatives trading and outstanding contracts, see
the summaries of annual levels of exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) derivative con-
tracts reported by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Summaries of Market Survey
Results, online at http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.htl (visited Jan 11, 2009). For US bank de-
rivatives activity, see Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks, OCC's Quar-
terly Report on Bank Derivatives Activities, online at http'/Jwww.occtreasgov/deriv/deriv.htm (visited
Jan 11,2009).
88 See Merton, 19 J Banking & Fm at 471 (cited in note 73) (contrasting innovations in deriv-
ative products, which can be implemented quickly, with changes in financial regulation, which take
longer and require more coordination to implement).
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equivalently. Moreover, the lag in financial reporting can be as long as
several months if the transaction is undertaken early in the quarter,
since quarterly reports are released long after the quarter's end, and
then there is a further lag before the firm files its Form 10-K or 10-Q.9
Robert Merton and Myron Scholes both observe that current fi-
nancial and regulatory accounting systems do a poor job of tracking
the risks associated with derivatives. As a result, regulations are gen-
erally going to be ineffective, while financial accounting statements
are often going to be misleading.?o Merton notes, "Accounting as a
structure is directed toward value allocations. On this dimension, it is
effective."9' However, he goes on to say that it is ineffective for identi-
fying risk exposure:
As an example, consider a hypothetical financial institution which
has fixed-rate-debt assets, floating-rate-debt financing and equi-
ty .... Suppose that this institution enters into a swap in which it
agrees to receive the floating interest rate and pay the fixed rate.
What is the impact of that? It is, of course, to match the risk in
terms of interest-rate exposure of its assets and liabilities by trans-
forming ... fixed-rate returns into floating-rate returns. But where
would that drastic change in the risk exposure of the equity appear
on the balance sheet? An accounting structure focused on valua-
tions has no place for it. Why? Because the value of a swap when
the firm enters into it is zero."
Thus, boards of directors and outside investors relying on traditional
financial accounting statements will not learn about these potential
risk exposures, undermining the board's monitoring role and the abili-
ty of investors to buy or sell shares in an informed manner. A major
89 Companies have between sixty and ninety days after the end of their fiscal year to file
their Form 10-K and between forty and forty-five days after the end of each fiscal quarter to file
their Form 10-Q. See Form 10-K, "General Instructions" A(2), online at httpJ/www.sec.gov/about/
formstformlO-k.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009); Form 1O-Q, "General Instructions" A(1), online at
http://www.sec.gov/aboutlformslformlO-q.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
90 Merton, 19 J Banking & Fin at 470 (cited in note 73) (arguing that the current account-
ing system only looks at value allocations and is, "therefore, an ineffective structure for identify-
ing risk allocations"); Scholes, 88 Am Econ Rev at 367 (cited in note 73) (noting how standard
accounting does not "decompose profitability into profits from market forces and profits from
managerial efforts, nor does it describe the sensitivities of the firm's profit and loss to market
factors"). In an earlier paper, Scholes states, "A whole new system of risk accounting must be
developed. Current accounting systems concentrate on static valuations. Swaps, foreign exchange
contracts, and other OTC derivatives have no initial value. As a result, they are 'off balance sheet.'
There is no place for them in the current accounting world." Myron S. Scholes, Global Financial
Market4 Derivative Securities, and Systemic Risks, 12 J Risk & Uncertainty 271,284 (1996).
91 Merton, 19 J Banking & Fin at 470 (cited in note 73).
92 Id.
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puzzle is why financial accounting has been so slow to address the
problem of derivatives risk exposure in corporations.
The risk taking associated with derivative trading is further com-
plicated by the fact that the default risk of counterparties in derivative
contracts is also very dynamic. This default risk can be substantially af-
fected by new derivative positions taken by counterparties, or by
changes in the financial condition and risk exposure of these counter-
parties' derivatives positions with other counterparties. Changes to ei-
ther of these can alter the default-risk exposure of otherwise unchanged
derivative contract positions in the original firm. Disturbingly, real-time
information on counterparty financial condition is generally unavaila-
ble. At best, a counterparty's general financial condition is only known
quarterly after a lag of another forty-five to ninety days, provided it is a
company subject to reporting requirements under US securities laws.
If the counterparty is not a reporting company, or is a foreign company
using less informative accounting reporting standards, then the problem
is much worse. These disclosure problems are compounded when the
assets underlying the derivative contracts are themselves not well do-
cumented or specified, or there is no active market in them."
A further concern is that the flexibility in derivative contract struc-
tures allows corporations and financial institutions to bypass disclosure
requirements, creating incentives for greater risk taking.9' Good exam-
ples of the problems created by large derivative positions that have fal-
len outside normal reporting requirements include Enron and a num-
ber of other financial scandals that involved firms assuming large risk
exposures unbeknownst to their boards and sometimes even their se-
nior management. As Brian Nocco and Ren6 Stulz observed, "Corpo-
rate failures to conduct thorough 'inventories' of their risks on a regular
basis have been responsible for a striking number of major corporate
disasters over the last 20 years."'
The reliability of financial reporting systems is an even more se-
rious problem for financial institutions (FIs) because the vast majority
of their assets are financial and thus more rapidly and easily changed
93 See note 89 for a discussion of the time lags for filing Forms 10-K and 10-Q.
94 For example, the changing composition of mortgage pools, which many mortgage-backed
securities allow, increases the difficulty of valuing these pools on a mark-to-market basis.
95 This is the one good reason for relying on an exchange-clearing corporation to be the
counterparty in all trades. Unfortunately, most derivative trades occur off the floors of derivative
exchanges. See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Summaries of Market Survey
Results (2008), online at http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (visited Jan 11, 2009) (cited in
note 87) (reporting that by mid-2008, the notional amount of off-exchange interest rate deriva-
tives had grown to $464.7 trillion).
96 Brian W. Nocco and Rend M. Stulz, Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice,
18 J Applied Corp Fin 8,15 (2006).
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through derivative transactions. Additionally, derivatives' activity levels
are typically high relative to firm asset values' as more fully discussed
in Part III.D. Changing risk-bearing profiles in FIs due to derivatives
are a particularly serious concern for several reasons: (1) FIs extensive-
ly use derivative contracts for hedging purposes, which means that they
routinely execute large derivative transactions in the ordinary course of
business without close scrutiny; (2) the large percentage of assets
represented by financial claims at FIs makes it easier to change their
risk characteristics; and (3) the high leverage employed by most FIs
makes equityholders particularly vulnerable to shifts in risk exposure
in an Fl's portfolio. These properties make it much more difficult to
detect abnormal derivatives trading activity that can substantially raise
FI risk exposure or increase their risk exposure to counterparties, even
in derivatives trades which FIs rely on to hedge some of their risks.
Merton and Scholes both argue that FIs have much more sophis-
ticated risk management control systems, which capture much of the
firms' derivative-related risk exposure, and advocate that other corpo-
rations adopt similar systems." They also argue that if FIs take very
different and offsetting derivatives positions, then the effect on the
overall financial systems is likely to be minor, since some institutions
will gain what others lose. However, this perspective is undermined if
FIs herd in their investment decisions and if there are other investors,
such as hedge funds, that can successfully bet against them. The recent
subprime mortgage crisis suggests that relying on offsetting gains and
losses by FIs is not particularly prudent. This crisis underlines a contin-
ued need to improve on the sophisticated systems used by FIs to re-
flect better their risk exposures.
Unfortunately, current risk-management control systems appear
to leave F1 boards with inadequate information about the actual risk
exposures these FIs are taking. Two particularly serious areas of defi-
ciency appear to be the assessment of counterparty default risk expo-
sure and the adverse effects on insurers of potential macro events, which
can overwhelm their reserves against losses. However, a more funda-
mental problem is that risks taken by counterparties can change quick-
ly, but there is no real-time control or monitoring of these risk expo-
sures. This can induce great uncertainty by market participants when
large negative shocks hit the capital markets, causing some participants
to take large observable losses and forcing other firms to sell assets at
distressed prices.
97 See Lisa K. Meulbroek, A Senior Manager's Guide to Integrated Risk Management, 14 J
Applied Corp F'm 56,61 (Winter 2002).
98 Merton, 19 J Banking & Fin at 472 (cited in note 73); Scholes, 88 Am Econ Rev at 364
(cited in note 73).
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To address the valuation needs of corporations and FIs holding or
trading complex derivative contracts, various simulations and analyses
of historical data are employed. However, given the extremely asym-
metric nature of most derivatives' returns, and the tendency of many
financial assets to suddenly become highly correlated in periods of
capital market distress, it is extremely difficult to adequately assess the
payoffs on these derivative contracts, especially from a short time se-
ries of historical derivative prices. This also implies that the risk asso-
ciated with these contracts can be seriously understated, particularly
when counterparty default risk is taken into account, while valuations
may be simultaneously overstated. The current difficulty in determin-
ing the payoffs on various mortgage-related derivative contracts is a
very good case in point. These problems are reinforced when the un-
derlying assets are not traded, or the derivative itself is not traded due
to its customized nature.
One result of this greater risk exposure is that FIs have a greater
need for sophisticated directors who are knowledgeable about deriva-
tive contracts and markets. These directors need to monitor intensively
these FIs on an almost continuous basis and implement rigorous inter-
nal risk controls and monitoring systems, which require updating as
the financial engineering technology evolves. While regulatory author-
ities have tried to reduce these concerns through their own monitoring
mechanisms, they have suffered from similar weaknesses.
B. Public Company Board Structures Need Strengthening
Public corporations are growing in size due to internal growth and
global consolidation within industries. One result is smaller percentage
shareholdings by their boards of directors, which results in lower direc-
tor incentives to monitor firms carefully. This can be reinforced if di-
rectors are paid with short-term bonuses and stock options because
these forms of compensation have short time horizons, making directors
less focused on the long-term value of the firm's stock.
At the same time, firms are becoming more complex (geographical-
ly and technologically) and bigger, making them more difficult to moni-
tor. Greater derivatives usage further raises monitoring costs for direc-
tors because of these instruments' complexity, lack of transparency, and
the potential they create for rapid changes in the firm's risk exposure.
An important implication of these two trends is that board over-
sight has been significantly weakened by poor incentives and higher
monitoring costs. In addition, there has been a shift toward nominat-
ing directors based on their independence from management, rather
2009]
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than their strategic insights into the business, because of concerns about
overall board independence from management. For example, corporate
boards have been criticized as being too chummy with managers." This
allegedly makes them slow to react to poor firm performance and too
willing to approve large compensation packages to senior executives
when they are hired, renewed, or fired.'0° While recent reforms of stock
exchange listing requirements have tried to encourage more financial
and familial independence of outside directors, there continue to be
serious concerns about the "social" independence of many directors.
The fear is that members of the same country clubs and social circles
may have trouble aggressively confronting their compatriots in the
boardroom. The importance of social independence of directors is
highlighted in a recent paper by Byoung-Hyoun Hwang and Seoyoung
Kim, which finds that greater social independence, as compared to con-
ventional independence, reduces measures of equity value and firm
performance at Fortune 100 companies.0' Unfortunately, while new,
"independent" directors may not be financially beholden to senior
managers, they may also lack the knowledge and appropriate skill set to
engage in effective risk monitoring.
Effective corporate governance relies on reliable and timely re-
porting of corporate performance measures for good internal board
monitoring and outside investor evaluation. Without accurate and time-
ly information on firm performance and risk taking, it is nearly impossi-
ble to evaluate how well a firm is performing and whether investors are
getting an appropriate market return for the risk that they are bearing.
Today's public company boards appear to lack the timely and accurate
financial information that they need to monitor risk levels adequately.
99 See, for example, Andrew S. Grove, Stigmatizing Business, Wash Post A23 (July 17,2002)
("[S]tock exchanges should require that boards of directors be predominantly made up of inde-
pendent members having no financial relationship with the company.").
100 See, for example, Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21
Oxford Rev Econ Policy 283,284 (2005) (finding that compensation growth cannot be explained
by changes in firm size, performance, or industry mix); Michael C. Jensen and Kevin Murphy,
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problem, and How to Fix
Them *29 (Harvard Business School Working Paper No 04-28, ECGI Finance Working Paper No
44/2004, July 2004), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=561305 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (discussing how
giving large compensation packages despite poor performance is not in the best interests of the
firm); Jensen, 48 J Fin at 866-67 (cited in note 24) ("Without the direction of an independent
leader, it is much more difficult for [a] board to perform its critical function.").
101 See Byoung-Hyoun Hwang and Seoyoung Kim, It Pays to Have Friends, J Fin Econ
(forthcoming 2009), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=1195313 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (finding
that from 1996 to 2005, 87 percent of Fortune 100 boards could be classified as "conventionally
independent," whereas only 62 percent could be classified as "socially independent").
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Insiders may have better knowledge about the firm and be better
able to process that information to create shareholder value."' The im-
plication is that while many outside corporate directors appear to ex-
hibit financial independence, this is often offset by these directors not
being well informed about company operations. This information prob-
lem is minimized in LBO firms given their frequent board meetings
and directors' close contact with management plus the significant board
representation of LBO investors.
Overall, these technological and institutional changes have in-
creased the costs of board monitoring at public companies while lower-
ing its effectiveness and requiring greater director expertise. As a re-
sult, directors with more specialized financial skills are needed on
boards in general and their time commitments as directors are likely
to continue rising.
C. Particular Implications of Increased Derivative Usage for
Financial Institutions
Over the last half century, FIs have grown dramatically in their as-
set holdings and have become much more diffusely held. Shareholder
oversight at these institutions has therefore become less effective since
few shareholders own a large enough percentage of the outstanding
shares to be strongly motivated to monitor carefully the firm's senior
managers. Likewise, senior management's equity ownership is general-
ly an extremely small percentage. Weaker monitoring creates further
difficulties in terms of giving F1 managers the appropriate incentives
to maximize shareholder value.'O
102 Ronald Masulis and Shawn Mobbs find that given their firm-specific knowledge, inside
directors can be very beneficial to board decisionmaking, especially when they have some inde-
pendence and serve on the boards of high-tech and other information-intensive firms. See Ro-
nald W. Masulis and Shawn Mobbs, Are All Inside Directors the Same? CEO Entrenchment or
Board Enhancement *3 (Third Annual Conference on Empirical Studies Paper, American Finance
Association 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper, Mar 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1108036 (visited Jan 11,2009).
103 For evidence of LBO board activity, see generally Acharya and Kehoe, Corporate Go-
vernance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity (cited in note 21) (finding that evi-
dence from private-equity transactions in the United Kingdom from 1996 to 2004 indicates that
buyout firms take an active stance on firm ownership and governance); Cornelli and Karakas,
Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards? (cited in note
21) (finding that private-equity board members are more actively involved in complex transac-
tions than board members backed by nonfinancial sponsors); Gertner and Kaplan, The Value-
maximizing Board (cited in note 21) (finding that as compared to public companies, the boards
of private-equity-controlled firms are smaller, control larger equity stakes, and meet less fre-
quently, while directors are younger and have shorter tenures).
104 One implication of this is that FIs are unlikely to be serious competitors to the private-
equity firms. This is especially true given the various regulatory constraints they face in holding
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For the last thirty years, FIs have been major players in an array of
derivatives markets. Scholes offers one explanation for this rapid adop-
tion by FIs of derivatives as a valuable and highly flexible financial tool:
To date the major growth in the use of derivatives has been fueled
by trends toward securitization and the increased understanding of
the role that derivatives can play in the unbundling, packaging,
and transferring of risk. No longer do financial service firms only
sell the same products they buy from clients. Instead, they break
the products down into their component parts and either sell the
parts or recombine them into new and hybrid custom-tailored fi-
nancial instruments.'05
In fact, many large FIs act like markets in over-the-counter interest rate,
currency and credit default swaps, and other more complex deriva-
tives, being long and short similar contracts. This large degree of de-
rivative exposure by FIs raises some serious questions and makes it all
the more important to have strong board oversight of FIs' derivative
risk exposure.106
Merton asks the following question regarding the rise in the use of
derivatives: "Why then is there now such an intensity of concern among
managers, regulators, politicians, and the press over the new activities
and risks of financial institutions -relative to their traditional risks such
as real estate loans or LDC debt?"1" He goes on to say:
My conjecture as to why there is this anxiety or strong focus on the
risks of the new activities is that their implementation has required
major changes in the basic institutional hierarchy and in the infra-
structure to support it and that the knowledge base required to
manage this part of the system is significantly different from the
traditional training and experience of many private-sector finan-
cial managers as well as regulators.1"
Having offered both the question and the answer, Merton then
claims that these are overstated concerns. He is optimistic about how
quickly institutions and regulators can adapt to the widespread use of
significant amounts of equity in illiquid, privately held firms. The one exception to this statement
is the creation of venture capital subsidiaries by some major commercial banks.
105 Scholes, 88 Am Econ Rev at 360 (cited in note 73).
106 It is surprising that banking authorities have not required banks to move this derivatives
market-making activity to a centralized exchange where transparency is enhanced and bank
exposure to counterparty default risk is greatly reduced.
107 Merton, 19 J Banking & Fm at 462 (cited in note 73).
108 Id.
[76:219
Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
derivatives. ' However, given the 2008 banking crisis, many of these
concerns seem well justified.
So where may the problems lie for FIs? Some major areas of vul-
nerability arise out of the increased inadequacy of current quarterly
disclosure requirements for banks, mutual funds, and insurance compa-
nies that fail to illuminate problems or large risk exposures at FIs. In-
adequate disclosure can have predictable negative consequences, such
as: (1) insufficient incentives for FIs to avoid taking short-term, high-
risk positions between quarterly disclosure points; (2) incentives to shift
risk exposure to undercapitalized firms; and (3) incentives to take on
more risk that is unrecognized in their financial reports to exploit formal
or informal government guarantees to insure these FIs against default.
Financial engineering techniques also make it much easier for FIs
to circumvent portfolio restrictions designed to limit their risk taking."0
This means that unless FIs' derivative positions are continuously mo-
nitored, huge changes in risk-bearing can occur for them in relatively
short periods of time. The result is that regulatory efforts to limit the
risk exposure of FIs can become ineffectual, enabling them to take on
much greater risks and increasing the chances of insolvency by large
FIs, with the associated potential for seriously disrupting the normal
functioning of capital markets.
Other major problems highlighted by the subprime mortgage cri-
sis are the difficulty in evaluating the risks associated with complex de-
rivative contracts, the pricing of derivatives lacking an active market in
the underlying assets or the derivatives themselves, and the importance
of taking into account counterparty default risk when one is trying to
hedge away a particular risk through a derivatives trade. This makes
the evaluation of an FI's risk exposure from its financial statements
much more problematic when it has undertaken substantial deriva-
tives positions, even if this activity is solely for the purpose of hedging
risks in its overall portfolio position."1' One result of this uncertainty is
the potential breakdown of trust between FIs, which can seriously un-
dermine liquidity in capital markets, especially when there are major
109 Id at 477 (predicting that central banks and other government policymakers are "likely
to become increasingly familiar" with derivatives and the "advanced financial technology" used
by financial institutions).
110 Scholes, 12 J Risk & Uncertainty at 284 (cited in note 90) (noting that, given the growth
and evolution in derivative contracting, "[the speed of institutional change has increased in
recent years. As new financial innovations have succeeded, regulatory conventions have become
obsolete, or lagged behind the new innovations").
Ill For a detailed discussion of the accounting treatment of derivatives, see generally Mark
A. Trombley, Accounting for Derivatives and Hedging (McGraw-Hill 2003).
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economic shocks or when markets are substantially volatile.1 1 2 The re-
cent turmoil in the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) market,
commercial paper market, and government securities market arising
from major investment bank and commercial bank financial problems
illustrates this point.
D. The Benefits of Firm Risk Management and the Need for
Manager and Board Involvement
Enterprise risk management has been widely adopted by compa-
nies in the United States." ' Enterprise risk management requires an
evaluation of the firm's total risk exposure so that the firm can choose
the optimal level of risk to maximize shareholder value."' At most
firms today, there is a senior management officer called the chief risk
officer who is directly responsible for the enterprise risk management
system, which tracks some of the major risks that the firm faces."5 A
well-designed risk management system ensures that "all material risks
are 'owned,' and risk-return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating
managers and employees throughout the firm."" 6 The best way to do so
is to ensure that managers have large equity positions so that they are
incentivized to avoid creating excessive risk exposures for their firm.
This addresses the problem of managers engaging in high-risk transac-
tions in order to meet short-term performance goals. However, risk
management systems are still in their early stages and have only re-
cently "expanded to include operating and reputational risks.""
112 See General Accounting Office (GAO), Financial Derivatives:Actions Needed to Protect
the Financial System, Report No GAO/GGD-94-133 to Congressional Requesters 12 (May 1994),
online at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151647.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009), which earlier raised these
concerns, and Scholes, 12 J Risk & Uncertainty at 273 (cited in note 90), which gave a critical
response to the GAO report. More recently, see International Monetary Fund, Global Financial
Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness 87 (Apr 2008),
online at http://www.imLorglExternalIPubs/FT/GFSRI2008/01lpdf/text.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009)
(summarizing evidence that from July 2007 to April 2008, increased market volatility and higher
default risks of potential counterparties made prices so unreliable that "no trading took place at
those prices").
113 Kenneth Scott argues that this trend is driven in part by legal liability from the In re
Caremark decision of the Delaware Chancery Court and SOX's emphasis on internal controls and
audit committees, but perhaps more importantly by the financial advantages to firms from adopt-
ing risk management. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Role of Corporate Governance in Coping with
Risks and Unknowns *7-8 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No 356, Apr 2008),
online at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/details/3993 (visited Jan 11, 2009), citing In re
Caremark International Inc Derivative Litigation, 698 A2d 959 (Del Ch 1996). See also Gilson and
Whitehead, 108 Colum L Rev at 249 (cited in note 19) (stating that corporate risk management
has only emerged in the last thirty years).
114 Meulbroek, 14 J Applied Corp Fin at 64 (cited in note 97).
115 Nocco and Stulz, 18 J Applied Corp Fin at 8 (cited in note 96).
116 Id.
117 Id at 10.
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Private-equity portfolio companies' managers have large, illiquid
stakes in their firms and therefore strong incentives to monitor firm risk
levels. In addition, private-equity directors may be better able to man-
age risk by, among other things, more intensive board monitoring, bet-
ter compensation systems that strongly motivate directors to monitor
risk intensively, and better information flows to the board.
IV. BENEFITS OF PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE CURRENT
DERIVATIVE-INTENSIVE ENVIRONMENT
Private equity creates more high-powered incentives for directors
and gives the boards of its portfolio companies increased control rights
over management. This makes these boards much better able to moni-
tor managers at their companies intensively and to recruit financially
sophisticated individuals to become directors. It also enables boards to
more effectively monitor firms' rapidly changing risk exposure, which is
facilitated by derivatives trading. At the same time, private-equity inves-
tors institute various enhancements to their portfolio companies' cor-
porate governance such as stronger and timelier internal management
reporting and control systems, increased equity ownership by managers
and directors, and more equity-based executive compensation systems.
8
A. Closer Monitoring by Private-equity Investor-directors
Private-equity transactions concentrate equity ownership. One im-
plication is that management can have a large share percentage owner-
ship stake, so they are highly motivated to work hard for their firm
and focus intensely on creating value. The other large shareholders in
these firms are sophisticated private-equity firms, who have strong in-
centives to monitor management carefully because their compensation
is tied directly to creating firm value. At the same time, the private-
equity firms typically have a dominant position on the board of direc-
tors, providing them with the power to discipline management as well.
A general prediction of the literature on optimal contracting is that
as it gets more difficult and costly to monitor managers, there should be
a greater reliance on risk-sharing through larger equity-based com-
118 See Orit Gadiesh and Hugh MacArthur, Lessons from Private Equity Any Company
Can Use 62-67 (Harvard Business 2008) (discussing how private-equity investors focus on for-
ward-looking operational metrics such as revenue churn, retention rates, and return on invested
capital); Thompson and Wright, 105 Econ J at 701 (cited in note 69) (evaluating the extent that
LBOs are an innovation in corporate governance and how far they remedy the agency problems
associated with diffuse shareholdings and management control).
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pensation contracts."9 Thus, the rise of derivatives, which undermines
board monitoring, should lead to a greater use of equity-based com-
pensation for management. This process is easier for private-equity
portfolio companies because, by being private, they avoid public criti-
cism for giving their senior portfolio company managers a large amount
of equity-based compensation.
On the other hand, the use of stock options can have deleterious
effects because the value of call options and warrants is a positive
function of stock risk. This means that managers with significant levels
of this form of compensation have greater incentives to take more
risk. Derivatives are an attractive means to add risk due to their lack
of transparency and the speed with which large positions can be taken.
Likewise, high leverage raises management incentives to take on more
risk. Both of these tendencies need to be counteracted by more in-
tense, sophisticated board monitoring and greater director discipline,
making more frequent board monitoring and evaluation of risk con-
trols particularly important.
Directors able and willing to undertake these tasks are hard to find
at public companies, where public scrutiny and relatively low compen-
sation make the cost-benefit calculations for becoming a director unat-
tractive. The same people, however, may find becoming directors at a
private-equity portfolio company more attractive because these boards
are small, their proceedings private, and director compensation can be
much greater than in public companies. In terms of the latter, given the
smaller equity base of these LBO firms, directors can be given larger
percentage ownership positions, which can further sharpen their incen-
tives.12 These incentives are again intensified by the LBO's high leve-
rage, which multiples the potential payoffs from success substantially.
In the final analysis, the directors at private-equity portfolio compa-
nies generally are either sophisticated outsiders with relatively large
percentage ownership stakes, or they are partners or employees of the
private-equity firm that holds a very large percentage ownership stake.
Either way, these directors are motivated to monitor management care-
fully and intensively.
Bringing a firm private also makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
managers to hedge away the risk of their stock and stock option hold-
ings since there is no secondary market for their firm's stock. This im-
proves the alignment of interests of managers and shareholders. The
119 For the pathbreaking article on this point, see Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Ob-
servability, 10 Bell J Econ 74, 75-80 (1979) (developing a model of optimal risk-sharing between
principals and agents when the principal can monitor only the outcome of the agent's actions).
120 It is worth noting that a small board reduces the financial cost of creating good director
incentives.
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lack of a secondary market also makes insider trading in the firm's
stock impossible, which is another benefit to other shareholders who
could otherwise suffer adverse price effects. The lack of a secondary
market gives the firm some ability to penalize managers who are pre-
maturely leaving the firm for better opportunities, or because they have
been fired, since the board has some discretion in valuing the firm's
illiquid equity and the manager is generally forced to sell the equity
back to the firm, often at the purchase price at the time of the LBO.
Another implication of the above analysis relates to the choice of
directors. In a private-equity-controlled company, boards are smaller
and directors with strong financial expertise can be more easily added
to the board, even if they have financial ties to the firm. Since these pri-
vate firm directors are well compensated, it becomes possible to attract
financially sophisticated individuals, again leading to more effective
director monitoring. In addition, private-equity firms, which generally
have great influence over the selection of outside directors, have sub-
stantial incentives to choose industry-knowledgeable, financially sophis-
ticated directors to ensure that their portfolio companies increase in
value."I This perspective leads to an interesting, testable prediction: do
firms with more financially sophisticated directors tend to have fewer
derivative-related problems?
One important trait of privately held firms is that outside investors
and board members have excess control rights. These rights give a port-
folio company CEO much stronger incentives to keep directors in-
formed about the firm's financial condition, its investment opportuni-
ties, and its positions in derivatives markets. They also provide the CEO
much stronger incentives to go along with the judgment of the directors
and private-equity firm partners, as well as limiting their ability to shirk
their duties, underperform, or to consume large amounts of perquisites.
Risk monitoring at private-equity-controlled portfolio companies
should be better than at public companies for several reasons. First, en-
terprise risk management requires all company managers, especially at
the more junior levels, to be focused on how their individual actions can
affect the entire company's risk profile. At private-equity firms, all mem-
bers of the management team have much larger ownership positions than
their public company counterparts and therefore have greater incentives
to worry about the firm's overall value. Furthermore, these private-equity
managers' equity interests are much more sensitive to variance in firm
value because of the relatively high debt burden carried by their firms,
again strengthening their incentives to watch risk levels carefully. Finally,
121 An interesting issue worthy of empirical documentation is the percentage of private-
equity directors who have substantial financial expertise.
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the board will exercise tighter monitoring of the managers' risk-inducing
decisions, with more financially experienced directors acting on better
information in a no-questions-barred environment to ensure that firm
value is maximized. This should reduce the likelihood of undetected,
large derivative-related risk exposure, especially at financial institutions.
Directors at private-equity portfolio companies have strong in-
centives to reduce the size of the corporate empire when the firm is no
longer growing rapidly but has accumulated large amounts of assets,
especially liquid assets. A key question that must be decided when a
firm faces strong liquidity pressures from its maturing debt is how much
to expend on research and development, and capital expenditures.
Again, having a sophisticated board should allow these decisions to be
made optimally. Without these liquidity pressures, there are clear man-
agement incentives to keep growing-and certainly no incentives to
shrink-the firm. However, the combination of these liquidity pressures
along with close board oversight means that efficient investment deci-
sions are more likely to be made.
Another important element of effective board monitoring is the
extent to which board members are given greater access to proprie-
tary information in these private-equity firms, which can include more
frequent and specialized financial reports. Greater internal financial
reporting facilitates more intensive monitoring of management. Con-
comitantly, private-equity firms should also employ more sophisticated
internal financial reporting and more reputable auditors, and should
require more detailed audits to further strengthen board oversight.
Private-equity investing could play a valuable role in the FI indus-
try. Having highly motivated and financially sophisticated directors
closely monitoring FI managers and derivatives activity is likely to sub-
stantially improve their operations. However, when governments ex-
plicitly or implicitly guarantee these institutions' liabilities against de-
fault through deposit insurance, reinsurance pools, and "too big to fail"
doctrines, the incentives of private-equity investors to invest in the sec-
tor are seriously reduced. This is especially true if these guarantees can
be lost when the FIs go private. In addition, a myriad of government
regulations prohibit many of the actions and corporate governance
changes that private-equity investors expect to implement, such as
changes to the FI's assets, liabilities, and operations. For example, un-
der prior Federal Reserve regulations, investors holding more than
10 percent of a bank's equity could not put a director on its board,
thereby negating one of the most important benefits of having private-
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equity investment in FIs.'" Although this was recently relaxed, 3 LBOs
of financial institutions do not generally occur.IU Instead, we see private-
equity investors participate in improving the efficiency of the FI in-
dustry indirectly, by buying large portfolios of distressed financial as-
sets from many large FIs, or by becoming substantial blockholders in
FIs and acting as monitors largely in their capacity as shareholders."
B. Benefits of Private Debt in the Current Derivative-intensive
Environment
The sophisticated private-equity firms rely on large debt increas-
es for their buyout transactions, with financing derived from a small
number of large institutional investors (including the private-equity
firm's debt funds) that buy the firm's private debt. This means that a
small number of financially sophisticated investors will be the private
firm's primary creditors)n
This has several advantages. First, debtholders have strong incen-
tives to monitor carefully firm risk and derivative exposures because it
is easy for the value of their investment to be adversely affected if the
firm does a poor job of managing its risk, given the extremely high leve-
rage the LBO starts out with. For example, debtholders will care a lot
about the firm's risk of financial distress, as it may reduce their likelih-
ood of repayment. As a result, after an LBO, these large debtholders
will monitor carefully the firm's actions and try to remain informed
about all-important derivatives exposure. The private-equity form of
ownership facilitates this process because it can provide debtholders
with better information.
122 Editorial, The Banks and Private Equity, NY Times WK9 (Aug 3, 2008) (indicating that
the previous rules discouraged private-equity investment in the financial sector because private-
equity firms could not gain control over target banks).
123 See text accompanying note 4 for a discussion of this change.
124 The most likely reason for this is that private-equity firms are unwilling to be regulated
by the Federal Reserve as financial holding companies, which would be one result of them ac-
quiring an FI. If this is correct, then the Federal Reserve needs to consider relaxing this rule.
Presumably it would make its decision by weighing the cost-benefit tradeoffs of allowing large,
loosely regulated capital injections from private-equity firms and closer risk monitoring versus
the potentially negative impact of a reduction in federal oversight of these institutions.
125 Given the federal government's decision to become a large stakeholder in many FIs
through its recent investments in those firms under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP),
it is interesting to speculate over whether the Federal Reserve should have considered creating
much greater incentives for private-equity investors to invest in FIs. Presumably the private-
equity firms would create stronger forward-looking risk monitoring controls at FIs (as well as
better monitoring of compensation levels) than what the federal government has been able to do as
of the time that this Article went to press
126 James Cotter and Sarah Peck find that sophisticated buyout shops use less short-term
debt and need less senior debt because these private-equity investors do a better job of monitor-
ing their portfolio companies. See Cotter and Peck, 59 J Fin Econ at 123-24 (cited in note 13).
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Second, use of private debt allows creditors to be more flexible in
dealing with covenant violations, permitting more customized covenants
to be used and potentially resulting in tighter contracts. As Charles
Whitehead notes, there are two reasons for this: growth in the syndi-
cated (private) loan market has allowed lenders to directly oversee bor-
rowers and at the same time the creation of borrower-specific cove-
nants that mitigate the cost of this direct oversight.'1The small number
of large and sophisticated creditors can directly monitor the borrower's
compliance with protective covenants, increasing their incentives to
carefully monitor borrowers relative to the incentives of trustees of
public bond issuers who may have little or no direct risk exposure in
the bond issue.2' In contrast, a debt violation in a public bond issue trig-
gers the need to obtain the agreement of two-thirds of the bondholders
to waive a violation, which can be both a difficult and a slow process.
Third, private debt enables creditors to have access to proprietary
firm information to facilitate in-depth monitoring, while avoiding public
transparency and the resulting competitive disadvantage borne by the
firm. Disclosure of proprietary information is limited to the private-
equity firm, the directors, and large creditors. By comparison, public
investor monitoring requires firm transparency, which can give competi-
tors without the need for such transparency a competitive advantage.
Further, many of these outside investors will hold both debt and
equity'29 and therefore have access to information that is provided to deb-
tholders, which can further inform them about an LBO firm's financial
condition, as well as give them access to information that is provided to
equityholders. In public firms, providing debtholders with this type of
report gives them valuable proprietary information that they can trade
on in the firm's stock.ln But, in an LBO, this information-trading oppor-
tunity is nonexistent given the lack of a secondary market in the stock.
127 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenant4 the Credit Market and Cor-
porate Governance *23-24 (Boston University School of Law Working Paper No 8-26, Jan 2009),
online at httpJwww.buedu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/document/WhiteheadC90208.pdf
(visited Jan 11,2009).
128 One seemingly contradictory piece of evidence is the recent popularity of covenant-lite debt
when institutional investors were competing to lend to private-equity borrowers This appears to
represent a serious failure in the commercial bank decisionmaking process that has had adverse con-
sequences. See Acharya, Franks, and Servaes, 19 J Applied Corp Fin at 52 (cited in note 28) (characte-
rizing covenant-lite loans as "a manifestation of weak lending standards and incentives to monitor").
129 Thompson and Wright, 105 Econ J at 692-93 (cited in note 69).
130 See, for example, Nishant Dass and Massimo Massa, The Bank-firm Relationship:A Trade-
off between Better Governance and Greater Information Asymmetry *4 (INSEAD Working Paper,
Sept 2008), online at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/corporate%20ftnance%202006/Massa.pdf
(visited Jan 11, 2009) (finding that public firms that have a more exclusive relationship with their
lending banks experience roughly a 1 percent increase in information asymmetry (insider trad-
ing) for every 10 percent increase in exclusivity).
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Another aspect of LBOs is that debtholders frequently receive
large warrant holdings, conversion rights, or stockholdings, which align
their incentives more closely with shareholders. This rarely occurs with
publicly held debt, where convertible bond issues or straight debt with
warrants are few in number. An important consequence of debthold-
ers also being major equityholders in these same firms is that it makes
them more amenable to debt restructuring in the case of a covenant
violation. This follows since their overall payoff is not only debt-based
but also rises with the value of the equity. Thus, they are concerned
not only with maximizing the debt's value but also the value of their
equity-related investment. So it is the joint maximization of the value
of their holdings in the firm's debt and equity that should matter to
these lenders. This allows the firm to take on greater leverage because
its expected bankruptcy costs are not raised to the same extent that
they would be if debtholders had no equity ownership.
To summarize, the advantages of debt structure in LBOs where
there are a few large and sophisticated private lenders are: better moni-
toring, better information, less disclosure of private information to the
marketplace, and debt/equity joint holdings that create incentives to
maximize total firm value and give the firm more flexibility if restruc-
turing is needed.
C. Institutionalization of Equity Holdings Supports Improved Risk
Monitoring in Private-equity-financed Deals
With almost 60 percent of all equities held by institutional inves-
tors, it is fair to say that a majority of shares in most large US corpora-
tions is now primarily held indirectly through institutional investors,
not directly by individual investors."' From a risk monitoring perspec-
tive, this is a positive development, as it leads to much larger block
holdings at public firms on average, which raises incentives for stock-
holder monitoring of the performance of the firm and its managers, and
allows for more coordination of shareholder voting decisions.
This institutionalization of equity can improve shareholder moni-
toring at private firms through institutional investor investments in
private-equity firms. The growth of these institutions means that they
have a large presence in major capital markets, including at private-
equity funds."a This dominant position of institutional investors has apositive effect for their smaller investors because these funds can in-
131 See Robert A.G. Monks and Nell Minnow, Corporate Governance 132 (Wiley 4th ed 2008).
132 See, for example, Martin Arnold, USS Commits to US Buy-out Fund, Fin Times 21 (June
18,2008) (describing UK pension funds joining the trend of US and Canadian pension funds by
investing in private-equity buyout funds).
20091
The University of Chicago Law Review
vest large amounts in private-equity deals on behalf of the smaller in-
vestors, and can negotiate on their behalf for lower fees. 31 These insti-
tutions monitor private-equity firms to ensure that they remain focused
on producing value for their investors, sharpening the private-equity
partners' focus on maximizing portfolio company value. Institutional
investors often also take substantial debt positions in private-equity
portfolio companies and act as monitors in that capacity as well.
Institutionalization may benefit private equity in other ways. Given
the substantial number of large institutional investors, private-equity
investors now have an alternative way to exit from their investments
without the need for IPOs or acquisitions. Instead, private-equity firms
can exit through a sale of their entire ownership position in the LBO
firm through privately negotiated syndicated sales to other institutional
investors. This alternative exit for private-equity investors means that
they now have a greater ability to invest in firms that are unlikely over
the following five years to either reemerge as public companies through
an IPO or be acquired by other public or private companies.
CONCLUSION
With the advent of extensive derivative usage, boards and regula-
tors are confronted with much more difficult monitoring problems.
Financial reports do not report derivative contract exposure in a time-
ly and transparent manner. At public companies, neither the senior
management nor the directors generally have the financial incentives
or ability to engage in continuous monitoring of a firm's derivative
contract positions. This creates ongoing challenges for even a diligent
board with strong financial expertise. Yet, few corporations have such
highly motivated and financially sophisticated directors.
Private equity offers several attractive benefits to help offset these
corporate governance problems First, share ownership is heavily concen-
trated with the creation of a controlling, monitoring blockholder. Second,
private-equity firms reduce board size, place control in the hands of di-
rectors representing large fractional owners in the firm, and ensure that
these directors are financially sophisticated and strongly motivated to
carefully monitor senior managers, to institute specialized reporting
requirements, and to set management incentive contracts to closely align
their interests with the blockholder and other outside shareholders.
Third, boards at private-equity portfolio companies have the power and
incentives to discipline and if necessary replace senior management.
Fourth, the extensive debt used to finance most going-private transac-
133 See id.
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tions also raises the risk of bankruptcy and job loss for senior managers
when a creditor takes over a financially distressed firm, motivating the
managers to work harder and the other stakeholders to be more open
to renegotiating contracts to strengthen the firm's financial condition.
Our analysis suggests that companies taken private by private-
equity firms are more likely to be firms: (1) with diffuse ownership, low
management shareholdings, and performance insensitive management
compensation plans; (2) that exhibit poor operating performance due
to weak board oversight; and (3) that periodically or actively engage
in derivatives trading activity. Investors face a particularly serious agen-
cy problem with financial institutions, given their frequent and often
heavy use of derivatives. There may be great opportunities for private
equity to become involved in improving the operations of these institu-
tions. The Federal Reserve Board's decision to ease the restrictions on
private-equity investors should give the funds more freedom in mak-
ing such investments, albeit with many restrictions on their ability to
closely monitor these firms' managements' decisions.'
134 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement on Equity In-
vestments in Banks and Bank Holding Companies at 7 (cited in note 4).
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